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This paper explains to what extent excess reserves are and should be relevant today
in the implementation of monetary policy, focusing on the speciﬁc case of the opera-
tional framework of the Eurosystem. In particular, this paper studies the impact that
changes to the operational framework for monetary policy implementation have on the
level and volatility of excess reserves. A ‘transaction costs’ model that replicates the
rather speciﬁc intra-reserve maintenance period pattern of excess reserves in the euro
area is developed. Simulation results presented not only show that excess reserves may
increase considerably under some changes to the operational framework, but also that
their volatility and hence unpredictability could.
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May 2004Non-technical summary
Excess reserves refer to the current account holdings of banks with their central bank beyond
required reserves. In the past, excess reserves were regarded as playing the key role in the
transmission of monetary policy. Banks were perceived as being more inclined to provide
loans when the volumes of excess reserves were high, and less inclined when low. Open
market operations were therefore - at least in theory - conducted with the main objective
of steering the level of excess reserves. This view on monetary policy implementation was
referred to as ‘reserve position doctrine’ (RPD). This situation has been reversed when cen-
tral banks returned to more explicit interest rate targeting at the beginning of the 1990s.
In the case of the US, no deposit facility limits the possible amount of excess reserves,
and thus the Fed can set excess reserves at any positive level by injecting suﬃcient funds
through open market operations. However, it does not make sense, at least under normal
circumstances, for the Fed to trigger an expansionary impulse by injecting through open
market operations excess reserves in order to trigger additional loans. Small aggregate sur-
pluses or deﬁcits in the money market relative to needs over the reserve maintenance period,
if recognized by market participants, lead to large and immediate changes of short term
interest rates. In particular, engineering through open market operations excess reserves on
an aggregate level simply means driving short-term interest rates to zero (or to the deposit
facility rate, if any). The problem with this channel is that (1) it is too radical for normal
times; (2) if not deemed to persist over some time, it provides little guidance on the future
evolution of short term rates, and therefore fundamentally destabilizes the yield curve and
therefore inter-temporal economic decisions by economic agents; (3) it is normally more rel-
evant to describe such a policy measure as the setting of a zero interest rate target, than to
deﬁne it as an excess reserves target.
Although excess reserves should not play a particular role in monetary macroeconomics,
it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in the day-to-day implementation
of monetary policy, since they constitute an only partially predictable reserve market factor,
similarly to other so-called autonomous liquidity factors like for instance the deposits of the
Government with the central bank or the volume of banknotes in circulation. This paper
hence focuses on explaining to what extent excess reserves are and should be relevant today
in the implementation of monetary policy, focusing on the speciﬁc case of the operational
framework of the Eurosystem. In particular, we study the impact that changes to the op-
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May 2004A simple ‘transaction costs’ model of excess reserves in the euro area is developed to address
these issues. Starting from the observation that in the euro area, excess reserves can in prin-
ciple always be avoided by recourse to the remunerated deposit facility, transaction costs are
modelled as the (low) costs to remain in the oﬃce until 18:30, which is the time when the
last payments have been settled, and around 90 minutes after the interbank market, in which
transactions are initiated, has closed. This model is used to simulate the following policy
scenarios: 1) Changing all key ECB interest rates; 2) Modifying the width of the corridor
of the standing facility rates; 3) Ending the deposit facility; 4) Changing the penalty rate;
5) Changing banks’ reserves requirements; 6) Changing the volatility of payment shocks.
Changes in the volatility of payment shocks can be interpreted as: a) changes in the eﬃ-
ciency of payment systems, b) changes in the volume of payment activities, or c) changes in
the smoothness of the functioning of money markets.
The simulation of the model shows not only that excess reserves may increase consider-
ably under some changes of the framework for monetary policy implementation, but also
that their volatility and hence unpredictability could. This may cause an increase of the
volatility of the overnight rate at the very end of the reserve maintenance period.
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Excess reserves refer to the current account holdings of banks with their central bank beyond
required reserves. In the past, excess reserves were regarded as playing the key role in the
transmission of monetary policy. Banks were perceived as being more inclined to provide
loans when the volumes of excess reserves were high, and less inclined when low. Open
market operations were therefore - at least in theory - conducted with the main objective
of steering the level of excess reserves. This view on monetary policy implementation was
referred to as ‘reserve position doctrine’ (RPD).1 This situation has been reversed when
central banks returned to more explicit interest rate targeting at the beginning of the 1990s.
Although it has thus been conﬁrmed that excess reserves should not play a particular role
in monetary macroeconomics, it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in
the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy. A central bank’s objective of steering
interest rates is achieved by managing the conditions that equilibrate supply and demand
in the market for bank reserves. When assessing the liquidity needs of the banking system,
it is necessary to take into account the expected value of excess reserves in a similar way as
is done for the so-called ‘autonomous liquidity factors’, e.g. the deposits of the Government
with the central bank or the volume of banknotes in circulation.
This paper explains to what extent excess reserves are and should be relevant today
in the implementation of monetary policy, focusing on the speciﬁc case of the operational
framework of the Eurosystem. In particular, we studies the impact that changes to the
operational framework for monetary policy implementation have on the level and volatility
of excess reserves. A simple ‘transaction costs’ model of excess reserves in the euro area
is developed to address these issues. Starting from the observation that in the euro area,
excess reserves can in principle always be avoided by recourse to the remunerated deposit
facility, transaction costs are modelled as the (low) costs to remain in the oﬃce until 18:30,
which is the time when the last payments have been settled, and around 90 minutes after
the interbank market, in which transactions are initiated, has closed.
The results show not only that excess reserves may increase considerably under some
changes of the framework for monetary policy implementation, but also that their volatility
and hence unpredictability could. This would cause an increase of the volatility of the
overnight rate at the very end of the reserve maintenance period. The model developed in
this paper follows the precautionary demand models of Orr and Mellon (1961) and Poole
(1968) that suggested that the demand for excess reserves should decrease with interest rates
and increase with the magnitude of payment shocks. This same result was also found for
1The term ‘reserve position doctrine’ is due to Meigs (1962, pp. 7-22).
the US by Dow (2001).
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Section 3 presents the relevant aspects of the operational framework of the Eurosystem
and explains the raison d’ˆ etre of excess reserves in the euro area. Section 4 describes the
patterns displayed by the series of excess reserves in the euro area, as well as some other
complementary data relevant for the calibration of the model. Section 5 develops the simple
economic model of the daily pattern of excess reserves within the maintenance period in
the euro area. Section 6 estimates and simulates this model and reports the results of a
number of experiments which investigate how changes in the operational framework and in
the level of short term interest rates could potentially impact on excess reserves and in the
implementation of monetary policy. Section 7 concludes.
2 The role of excess reserves in monetary policy
In the 19th century and until around 1920, central bank policy implementation was perceived
as short-term interest rate policy in the form of ‘Bank rate’ (i.e. discount rate) policy.
This perception was not only limited to the case of a commodity standard, but authors like
Thornton, Bagehot, Wicksell and in the earlier 20th century, Cassel, also viewed interest rate
policy as the natural approach to monetary policy implementation under a paper standard.
This view was mainly abandoned for around 60 years in preference for RPD as a result of the:
i) revival of the quantity theory of money by Irving Fisher among others, ii) introduction of
the money multiplier by C.A. Phillips in 1920, and iii) diﬃculties and misunderstandings in
the implementation of monetary policy experienced by the Fed in its ﬁrst decade (See e.g.
Meltzer (2003)).
RPD downplayed the role of short-term interest rates in the implementation of monetary
policy. Instead, excess reserves were regarded as playing the key role as starting point of
monetary policy transmission. Banks were perceived as being more inclined to provide loans
when the volumes of excess reserves were high, and less inclined when low. Open market
operations were therefore conducted with the main objective of steering the level of excess
reserves. Keynes (1930, p. 226) explained the basic idea of RPD as follows.
“The ﬁrst and direct eﬀect of an increase in the Bank of England’s
investments is to cause an increase in the reserves of the joint stock
banks and a corresponding increase in their loans and advances on the
basis of this. This may react on market rates of discount and bring
the latter a little lower than they would otherwise have been. But it
will often, though not always, be possible for the joint stock banks to
increase their loans and advances without a material weakening in the
rates of interest charged. ”
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was that excess reserves are an indicator of the degree of ease or tightness of monetary
policy. When excess reserves are large, banks supposedly are eager to provide loans. When
they are small, banks are supposedly under pressure to pay oﬀ their indebtedness and will
restrict credit. The popularity of this view is reﬂected in the literature surveyed by Meigs
(1962) or in the interpretation of the Great Depression by Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Generally, monetarists, which liked quantities, but tended to dislike the idea of central bank
control of (short term) interest rates, broadly supported RPD. However, they were less
keen on being bothered with a need to split up their most cherished concept for monetary
policy implementation, the monetary base, into petty-minded technical concepts like excess
reserves, free reserves, borrowed reserves, etc. The 1979-82 Fed experiment with short term
monetary control was probably the most ambitious attempt to put some sort of RPD into
practice.
This situation was reversed at the beginning of the 1990s when central banks returned to
more explicit interest rate targeting.2 A notable exception to this general trend is of course
the move of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) of 19 March 2001 in which it ﬁrst announced some
form of target for reserves (and hence excess reserves), which was subsequently increased
on several occasions. The move seemed to be at least not inconsistent with Friedman and
Schwartz (1963). However, the BOJ acknowledged that it is “as drastic as is unlikely to be
taken under ordinary circumstances.”
In the case of the US, no deposit facility limits the possible amount of excess reserves,
and thus the Fed can set excess reserves at any positive level by injecting suﬃcient funds
through open market operations. Why thus doesn’t it make sense, at least under normal
circumstances, for the Fed to trigger an expansionary impulse by injecting through open
market operations excess reserves in order to trigger additional loans? An observation made
130 years ago by Bagehot (1873, pp. 58) in his book Lombard Street explains the problem
with this idea:
“[Money] is a commodity subject to great ﬂuctuations of value and those
ﬂuctuations are easily produced by a slight excess or a slight deﬁciency
of quantity. Up to a certain point money is a necessity. If a merchant
has acceptances to meet tomorrow, money he must and will ﬁnd today
at some price or other. And it is this urgent need of the whole body
of merchants which runs up the value of money so wildly and to such
a height in a great panic. On the other hand, money easily becomes a
drug, as the phrase is, and there is soon too much of it. ”
2See ECB (2002) and Beek (1981) for the Fed.
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market rates.3 Anyone knowing central bank operations will tend to conﬁrm Bagehot’s
position: small aggregate surpluses or deﬁcits in the money market relative to needs over
the reserve maintenance period, if recognized by market participants, lead to large and
immediate changes of short term interest rates. In particular, engineering through open
market operations excess reserves on an aggregate level simply means driving short-term
interest rates to zero (or to the deposit facility rate, if any). This happened in the US during
the 1930s and is today practiced in Japan, but even much smaller excess reserves than those
engineered during these episodes are suﬃcient to drive interest rates to zero.
Leaving aside the fact that in both cases it does not seem to have helped by itself to create
credit expansion, the problem with this channel is that (1) it is too radical for normal times;
(2) if not deemed to persist over some time, it provides little guidance on the future evolution
of short term rates, and therefore fundamentally destabilizes the yield curve and therefore
inter-temporal economic decisions by economic agents; (3) it is normally more relevant to
describe such a policy measure as the setting of a zero interest rate target, than to deﬁne it
as an excess reserves target.
Although it has thus been conﬁrmed that excess reserves should not play a particular
role in monetary macroeconomics, it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge
in the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy, since they constitute an only partially
predictable reserve market factor, similarly to other so-called autonomous liquidity factors
like for instance the deposits of the Government with the central bank or the volume of
banknotes in circulation.
3 Raison d’ˆ etre of excess reserves in the euro area
Excess reserves cannot be understood without considering the environment in which they
are generated. This environment is determined by the following factors:
A. The operational framework of the ECB. The operational framework of the Eurosystem
is characterized by the following elements of key relevance to excess reserves:
- Reserve requirement system with a one month averaging period. Credit institu-
tions in the euro area are required to hold minimum reserves on accounts with the
national central banks. Broadly speaking required reserves of individual banks
are calculated by applying a reserve ratio of 2% to their short term liabilities. A
3Bagehot’s description of the money market is not less valid in the 1920s, when Keynes developed his
Treaties on Money, as the Macmillan Committee hearings of 1929 may suggest. Today’s money markets are
even more eﬃcient, and thus prices react even faster to imbalances of quantities than at those times.
Bagehot’s description of the money market is exactly opposite to the indeed counter-
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substantial number of small banks ends with eﬀectively zero reserve requirements.
Compliance with reserve requirements is determined on the basis of the average
reserve holdings over a maintenance period of one month. Reserve holdings not
exceeding the minimum reserve requirements are remunerated at market rates,
but excess reserves are not remunerated at all. It should be highlighted that in
the present paper the term excess reserves strictly refers to the diﬀerence between
accumulated reserve holdings, e.g. at day t of the maintenance period the sum
of the reserve holdings of days 1 to t,a n dtotal reserve requirements, i.e. 2% of
short term liabilities multiplied by the number of days in the maintenance pe-
riod. This averaging system of the euro area implies that banks subject to reserve
requirements are unlikely to generate excess reserves for most of the reserve main-
tenance period. Only towards the end of the reserve maintenance period, when
the remaining accumulated reserve requirement to be fulﬁlled becomes small, the
likelihood of generating excess reserves as a result of unanticipated liquidity pro-
viding payment shocks increases.
- Standing facilities. As many other central banks, the Eurosystem oﬀers to banks
an advance (or lombard) facility, called the marginal lending facility. Banks can
thus always reﬁnance overnight at a rate normally 100 basis points above market
rates. In addition the Eurosystem oﬀers a deposit facility, in which banks can
always deposit excess reserves at end of day. Both standing facilities can be ac-
cessed after all inter-bank payments have been processed. The euro area payment
system TARGET usually closes at 18:00 and the processing of all payments is
normally completed by 18:30. The banks can make use of either of the standing
facilities until 18:30. The existence of a deposit facility implies that there is in
fact no a priori rationale for excess reserves since in the event of excess reserves
after all intra-bank payments of the day have been processed, it always pays to
deposit them at the deposit facility. Thus, in the euro area, the only reason for
excess reserves can be that a bank does not care, or that the transaction costs as-
sociated with the recourse to the deposit facility are higher than the remuneration
expected from placing those funds in the deposit facility. If the latter calculus
is relevant, then the level of ECB rates, which includes the deposit facility rate,
should also determine the amount of excess reserves.
B. The reserves supply policy of the ECB. The reserve supply policy through open market
operations of the ECB is, according to ECB (2002), normally characterized by the
11
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system to the marginal lending facility equal to the likelihood of an aggregate recourse
to the deposit facility, such that short term market rates tend to remain in the middle
of the 200 basis points corridor set by the two standing facility rates. To be able
to keep money market conditions neutral in this sense, the weekly frequency of open
market operations implies a need to forecast all factors impacting on the demand for
reserves. These include the typical autonomous factors, i.e. Government deposits and
banknotes, as well as excess reserves. A precise forecast is critical especially for setting
the volume of the last main reﬁnancing operation of the maintenance period because
forecast errors can no longer be compensated through other open market operations
within the reserve maintenance period. Large forecasting errors lead to corresponding
liquidity imbalances at the end of the maintenance period, which can then also lead
to a signiﬁcant deviation in the overnight rate from the minimum rate of the main
reﬁnancing operation set by the ECB.
C. The structure of the payment system and volume of payment activity. The euro area
interbank money market and payment system is characterized overall by a high degree
of eﬃciency and reliability. The reliability of systems implies that it is normally not
technical failure of payment systems which generate payment shocks and thus poten-
tially excess reserves, but human mistake in the use of the systems or failure of banks’
local IT systems connected to the payment system.
Excess reserves in the US and their treatment in monetary policy implementation were
described in detail some time ago by Beek (1981). Although we will not revisit the patterns
of excess reserves in the US, it is worth looking brieﬂy at the main institutional diﬀerences
to understand what is speciﬁc to the euro area. First, reserve requirements are today much
lower in the US, where the averaging capacity is less than 10 per cent of the one in the
euro area (see e.g. Blenck, Hasko, Hilton, and Masaki (2001)). This should imply that
the maintenance period pattern of excess reserves is somewhat weaker in the US, and that
excess reserves are overall somewhat higher. Second, there is no deposit facility in the US.
Therefore, also aggregate surpluses of reserves have to end as excess reserves, and not like in
the euro area to a large extent as a recourse to the deposit facility. Basically, one could say
that the US excess reserves correspond to the sum of excess reserves and the recourse to the
deposit facility in the euro area. Of course, the related incentives to banks are somewhat
diﬀerent in the two cases, and therefore, if everything else remained equal, a system with
a deposit facility would not generate the same level of excess reserves plus recourse to the
deposit facility as a system without a deposit facility would generate excess reserves. Finally,
12
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reserve maintenance period. This speciﬁcation will contribute to lowering excess reserves in
the US as compared to the euro area. The net eﬀect of the mentioned three key diﬀerences
on the total level of excess reserves can be in either direction, since the ﬁrst two suggest that
excess reserves in the US would be lower, while the last one suggests the opposite.
4 Excess reserves and complementary euro area data
Excess reserves can be split into two main categories: excess reserves generated by banks that
are not obliged to fulﬁl minimum reserve requirements (X1), and excess reserves generated
by banks obliged to fulﬁl reserve requirements (X2). Figure 2 shows the evolution of average
excess reserves per maintenance period in the euro area for the period January 2000 to March
2003. The daily average level of excess reserves was EUR 743 million over this sample, with
a standard deviation of EUR 176 million. The minimum was EUR 589 million in March 2001
and the maximum EUR 1644 million in January 2002. This exceptionally high ﬁgure was
due to the euro cash changeover which resulted in extraordinarily high payment uncertainties
because of the high volatility of the level of banknotes in circulation. Overall, X1 averaged
EUR 161 million with a standard deviation of EUR 39 million. X2 constitutes most of the
total of excess reserves. The daily average of X2 has been EUR 582 million with a standard
deviation of EUR 162 million.
The level of excess reserves during a maintenance period displays a fairly regular and
predictable pattern, see ﬁgure 3. It remains low during most of the maintenance period,
and builds up rapidly over the last few days. The slightly increasing trend throughout the
maintenance period obviously stems from the fact that the number of banks which have
already fulﬁlled their required reserves, and which may hence accumulate excess reserves if
they are exposed to a positive liquidity shock at the end of the day (if they do not make
recourse to the deposit facility), increases monotonously. The steep increase in excess reserves
on the last days of the maintenance period conﬁrms that banks which actually have to fulﬁl
relevant reserve requirements play an important role in generating excess reserves (X2), since
banks which do have not to fulﬁl any eﬀective reserve requirements (X1) should, ceteris
paribus, accumulate excess reserves in a proportional manner over the reserve maintenance
period.
In addition to the data on daily excess reserves, the ECB has also collected data on the
monthly reserve requirements of 3522 individual banks for the period from January 1999 to
August 2001. These banks’ reserve requirements account for most of the euro area reserve
requirements. In August 2001, for example, the combined reserve requirement of these banks
13
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billion. The distribution of reserve requirements is skewed heavily towards zero, see table
1. Indeed, in August 2001, 551 banks out of those for which data is available have eﬀective
reserve requirements of exactly zero (due to the lump sum allowance of EUR 100,000). The
average for this sample of 3522 banks is EUR 30 million, ranging from EUR 0 million to
EUR 3694 million. This compares with the average for the Eurosystem as a whole which
is EUR 17 million. In the simulation exercises conducted below, the reserve requirements
of the remaining banks not included in this sample (which accounted for 16% of aggregate
reserve requirements) were assumed to have a similar distribution with the values scaled
downwards proportionately. Since the data was only available up to August 2001, it was
further assumed that each bank’s reserve requirement as a proportion of the total euro area
reserve requirement remained the same when the simulations were carried out for subsequent
maintenance periods.
Finally, data on the recourse to standing facilities has been collected for the sample
period. In the period May 2001 to February 2003, the average total daily recourse by euro
area banks to the marginal lending facility amounted to EUR 263 million, while the recourse
to the deposit facility amounted to EUR 231 million. As ﬁgure 4 reveals, these ﬁgures vary
to some extent from one reserve maintenance period to the next, with a few outliers. No
data was available to the authors on how widespread these recourses were across banks.
5 A transaction costs model of excess reserves
There are two calendar related features that render the formulation of our model cumber-
some. Namely, i) money markets are closed over the weekend, and ii) the last day of the
maintenace period may occur over the weekend. For the sake of clarity we formulate the
model ignoring these complications, and leave for the appendix its more complicated ‘full’
algebraic formulation.
5.1 Variable deﬁnition
We deﬁne T as the total number of days in a maintenance period, and the subindex t =
1,...,T will be used to denote a particular day of the maintenance period. For a given bank
at time t we further deﬁne:
q reserve requirements.
εt end of day payment shock (liquidity shock).
rI
t reserve holdings before the occurrence of εt.
dt recourse to the deposit facility.
14
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rII
t reserve holdings after the occurrence of εt but before recourse to dt and mt.
rIII
t reserve holdings at the very end of the day.
ht ‘stay or go’ dummy variable of value either 0 (leave) or 1 (stay).
st cumulative ‘gross’ excess reserves after recourse to standing facilities (see below).
δ the cost of ‘staying in the oﬃce’.
The key ECB interest rates are deﬁned as:
id
t rate of the deposit facility.
im
t rate of the marginal lending facility.
ir
t remuneration rate of reserve requirements.
i
p
t penalty rate applied to the part of reserve requirements not fulﬁlled.
Figure 1 helps to understand the deﬁnitions above by showing the daily time schedule for
reserve management faced by treasurers. After the interbank money market has eﬀectively
closed in the late afternoon between 17:30 and 18:00, each bank’s treasurer knows fairly
precisely his position in the interbank market, and by how much he still has to fulﬁl his reserve
requirements. However, the treasurer still faces the possibility of a late payment shock, which
may be due to: some erroneous handling of a payment by himself or by another bank, a
technical problem with the payment system connection of a bank, or any other unexpected
event implying that payments do not go out or come in as expected. In the euro area, it is
always possible for banks to deposit excess funds at the deposit facility at 18:30 (when no
further payment shock can take place because payment systems are closed), and thus excess
reserves could be eliminated. The variable ht takes the value of 0 if the treasurer decides to
leave the oﬃce at 17:30 , and the value 1 if he decides to stay until 18:30. The opportunity
cost of holding excess reserves is the interest earned from placing them on the deposit facility
with the central bank. Assuming that the recourse to the deposit facility is overnight (one
day) and that the interest rate of the deposit facility is 2.25%, the amount of lost interest
for all banks in the euro area is fairly substantial at around EUR 15 million per year. For
an individual bank, however, the amounts are much less signiﬁcant - the opportunity cost
of holding excess reserves of EUR 100,000 for one day is only 6.25 euro. This gain does not
justify ﬁlling in a form on a computer or picking up the phone. Staﬀ members often do not
stay until 18:30, since the money market normally opens at around 8:00 and covering the
day until 18:30 would imply excessive labour costs. We will refer to this cost as the ‘cost to
15
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Excess reserves are hence deﬁned as Ψ(st); where Ψ(x) is a function that takes the value of
x for x>0 and the value of 0 otherwise.
5.2 Liquidity management framework in the euro area
It further follows from the speciﬁc nature of the operational framework of the ECB, and in






































if t = T
(4)
where Θ(x) is a function that takes the value of 1 if x ≥ 0 and the value of zero other-
wise. Although at ﬁrst sight equations (4) and (3) appear complicated, they can be easily
explained. First, recourse to the deposit facility requires an active decision by a bank, and
this explains the term ht in equation (3). Furthermore, the remuneration rate for reserves is
higher than the remuneration rate of the deposit facility, and therefore no use will be made of
the deposit facility if the reserve holdings count towards reserve requirements, but once they
exceed that amount they should be placed in it, or otherwise they will not be remunerated
at all. Second, recourse to the marginal lending facility is automatic in the event of negative
holdings. Negative holdings trigger an immediate response from the ECB, as no bank is
allowed to have an uncollateralised overdraft overnight. Additionally, on the last day of the
maintenance period, and if the bank treasurer decides to stay, it pays to avoid the penalty
of possible unfulﬁlled reserve requirements by making use of the marginal lending facility.
Obviously, this is so if the penalty rate exceeds the rate of the marginal lending facility,
which is always the case.
4For the sake of simplicity only this type of transaction cost is incorporated. There are for example some
‘once and for all’ set up costs to make recourse to the deposit facility possible for a bank. These costs may
consist in signing a speciﬁc operational agreement with the central bank, or in agreeing internally on the
‘credit line’ to be granted to the central bank. Although placing deposits in the central bank is free of risk,
internal procedures in banks may be such that the central bank is treated as a normal counterpart. These
costs may be suﬃcient to prompt a counterparty, that thinks that has little need for the deposit facility, to
spare them. Indeed, only around 48% of credit institutions have access to the deposit facility.
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The expected CF related to reserve holdings with the central bank if the treasurer decides
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fεtdε. The integrals in the equation weight shocks by their probabil-
ity, and the coeﬃcients outside the integrals represent their return. The ﬁrst integral refers
to large negative shocks that would leave the bank with negative reserve holdings by closing
time and would thus trigger the use of the marginal lending facility at the im
t rate. The
second integral refers to shocks that would leave the bank with positive reserve holdings, all
of which would be remunerated at the ir
t rate. The third integral refers to shocks that would
induce unfulﬁlled reserve requirements, and this explains why this integral has a coeﬃcient
diﬀerent from zero only at the end of the maintenance period. This coeﬃcient is im
t if the
treasurer decides to stay and i
p
t, the penalty rate if he decides to leave. The fourth integral
refers to shocks that induce cash holdings in excess of reserve requirements. These will only
be remunerated at the deposit rate id
t if the treasurer stays, but will not be remunerated,
i.e. coeﬃcient zero, if the treasurer leaves. The solutions to those integrals in Ct (a,b,c,d)
under normality assumptions are provided in the appendix. It then follows that the optimal











Thus far all equations presented in the paper are linked to the particular nature of the
operational framework of the ECB. We now incorporate our ﬁrst modelling assumptions:
Assumption 1 Banks face a probability 1−p of being hit by a payment shock εt. εt is nor-
mally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2 = α1+α2q,w h e r eα1 and α2 are nonnegative.
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Assumption 3 Banks aim to fulﬁl reserve requirements proportionally. By the time money
markets close, reserve holdings should be that amount that needs to be held daily (until the
end of the maintenance period) to fulﬁl reserve requirements.
Assumption 4 Banks keep precautionary holdings g with the central bank; where g = β1 +
β2q and β1 and β2 are nonnegative.
No data on the individual banks’ end of day liquidity shocks is available, nor do we have data
for the payment system activity of banks which could be regarded as a proxy. Assumption
1 implies that liquidity shocks are positively correlated with bank’s reserve requirements,
reﬂecting the idea that large banks are exposed to larger liquidity shocks. The parameter α1
is needed otherwise banks with zero reserve requirements would also have zero shocks. From
anecdotal evidence, the distribution of liquidity shocks is likely to exhibit leptokurtosis: this
explains the decision to have distribution of shocks with a probability p being zero.
Valimaki (2001) and Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez-Mendizabal (2001) suggested that the
exact modelling of optimizing reserve fulﬁlment behaviour subject to liquidity shocks over
an entire reserve maintenance period of 30 days is extremely complex. It is not only diﬃcult
to calibrate with data, but is also unlikely to be followed by bank treasurers who often
follow simple rules of thumb. Assumption 3 states that banks follow a rather simple and
straightforward strategy in their fulﬁlment of reserve requirements. This assumption together
with assumption 4 on precautionary holdings can be formulated into:
r
I
t = g +
Ψ
 





T − t +1
(6)
Equations (1) to (6) complete the formulation of the model.
6 Simulation results
6.1 Simulation method
We use capital letters to deﬁne the euro area aggregate equivalents of those variables deﬁned
in section 5 above.5 For example Mt is the aggregate use of the marginal lending facility in
the euro area, i.e. the sum of mt for all banks. Excess reserves were deﬁned as Ψ(st), we
now denote the aggregate value of excess reserves by XRt.
5Once more, and for presentational purposes, we ignore in the formulation the diﬃculties associated with
weekend days. The appendix addresses this issue.
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24 April 2001 and the last ending on 23 March 2003.6 We thus adopt the strategy of using a
second subindex to denote the maintenance period. For example, Mn,t is the aggregate use of
the marginal lending facility for day t of maintenance period n, with the total number N =
23. We further deﬁned the parameter vector to be estimated by γ = {p,δ,α1,α 2,β 1,β 2} ,a n d
the vector Y n,t = {XRn,t,M n,t,D n,t} . Simulated least squares has been used to estimate








(Y n,t − E{Y n,t})
  (Y n,t − E{Y n,t})( 7 )
and where for P a large number, the value of E{Y n,t} is estimated by P −1  P
j=1 Y
j
n,t,w h e r e
Y
j
n,t is simulated from our model. We deﬁne our estimate ˆ γ as that γ that solves (7). Using
this parameter vector ˆ γ ﬁfty simulations over the same sample period were computed. This
provided estimates of the mean and standard deviation of all relevant series.
6.2 Simulation results
The estimated parameters are displayed in table 2. The variance of liquidity shocks is
composed of two terms: α1 =0 .019 million of euro and the coeﬃcient α2 =0 .17 that
multiplies the level of required reserves. The surprisingly low ﬁxed term results probably
from the high number of banks with zero reserve requirements, which after all do not generate
so much excess reserves. Indeed, there are many specialized institutions among those zero
reserve requirement banks which are typically not exposed to any stochastic ﬂows of reserves.
For instance, a bank with average required reserves of EUR 17 million would have a variance
of shocks of around EUR 25 billion, whereby only in 62% of days such shocks would actually
occur, as revealed by the parameter p of 0.38. The cost of staying, δ, is EUR 200, which
looks relatively high. However, when taking into account that a recourse to the deposit
facility not only requires the presence of one staﬀ member, but also likely some manager
and a back oﬃce team, then this ﬁgure appears plausible. Furthermore, one should note
that in the euro area the payment system opens at 8 and money markets are rather active
already at 9:00. Therefore, ordinary staﬀ with a maximum 40 hours working week tends
to be unwilling to stay until 18:30, and staﬀ presence of that time may therefore require
establishing an expensive shift work system.
Figure 5 compares the actual intra-maintenance period pattern of excess reserves with
the average pattern from the ﬁfty simulations for the 21 maintenance periods from 24 July
6The estimation could not be performed over an earlier time horizon because accurate daily German
excess reserve data was not available.
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well for all maintenance periods (whether it ended on a weekend or not), except for the ﬁrst
two maintenance periods of 2002 which were aﬀected by the euro cash changeover. These
maintenance periods were thus excluded from the results reported in the tables and also
from ﬁgure 5. At the start of the maintenance period, many of the treasurers with positive
reserve requirements would choose to leave the oﬃce at 17:30 since there will normally be
little possibility of generating excess reserves. The problem for the treasurer arises as he
gradually fulﬁls his reserve requirements, because it increases the probability that a positive
shock will force him to fulﬁl his reserve requirements before the last day of the maintenance
period and thus lead him to hold ‘excess’, non-remunerated reserves, when faced with a
positive liquidity shock.
The upper part of table 3 also compares the actual data for excess reserves with the
simulated results, calculated as a percentage of reserve requirements. Results for X1 and X2
refer to the actual value on the last day of the maintenance period; results for the use of the
marginal lending facility (ML) and the use of the deposit facility refer to the average used
over the maintenance period. Broadly speaking our model replicates the fact that the level of
excess reserves is high while the average use of both standing facilities is low. The value for
X2 is 12.7%, and for X1 is 3.26% while the average use of the ML and DF facilities is 0.99%
and 0.21% respectively. These values are very similar to those observed in the euro area.
Furthermore, as shown in ﬁgure 5, the daily pattern of the simulated series of excess reserves
follows also very closely that of the actual series. It needs to be admitted that the obtained
ﬁgure for the recourse to the marginal lending facility seems to over-estimate actual recourse
(which is only slightly higher than actual recourse to the deposit facility). The fact that end
of day liquidity absorbing shocks can force banks already early in the maintenance period
into recourse to the marginal lending facility, while the same rarely holds for the deposit
facility, makes the actual ﬁgures more surprising than the ones obtained in the simulation.
Maybe one reason for the relative similarity of the sizes of the two actual recourses stems
from the practice of some banks to use the deposit facility already earlier in the maintenance
period in case of liquidity injecting shocks, even if they still have reserve requirements to be
fulﬁlled.
6.3 Simulation of policy scenarios
Using the model and the estimated parameters, some scenario analysis was performed to
see the impact on the level and volatility of excess reserves of changing some of the key
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May 2004i. Increase all key ECB interest rates by 2%
ii. Decrease all key ECB interest rates by 2%
iii. Narrow symmetrically the corridor set by standing facilities by 100 basis points
iv. Widen symmetrically the corridor set by standing facilities by 200 basis points
v. Abolish the deposit facility rate (leaving other rates unchanged)
vi. Increase the penalty rate by 5% (leaving other rates unchanged)
vii. Decrease the penalty rate by 2.5% (leaving other rates unchanged)
viii. Increase banks’ reserve requirements by 100%
ix. Decrease banks’ reserve requirements by 50%
x. Increase the variance payment system shocks by 100%
xi. Decrease the variance payment system shocks by 50%
The diﬀerent policy scenarios were simulated over the same time horizon, (24 July 2001
to 23 March 2002), with 50 simulations for each scenario, such that eventually, data for
50 times 21 maintenance periods was generated for each. The average accumulated excess
reserves as a percentage of reserve requirements and the standard deviation were calculated
for each scenario, see table 3. The bottom part of table 3 displays, for easier reading, the
ﬁgures for the hypothetical scenarios as percent of the ﬁgures of the baseline scenario.F o r
monetary policy implementation, the impact on the standard deviation is perhaps the most
important, as this determines how easy it is to forecast excess reserves when the ECB makes
the allotment decisions in its open market operations.
As expected, excess reserves in the category X1 are practically unaﬀected by the diﬀerent
policy scenarios. However, there is a more signiﬁcant impact on excess reserves in category
X2 and therefore a corresponding impact on total excess reserves.
Scenario i and ii. Increasing all key ECB interest rates by 2% leads to a reduction
of around 75% for X2 excess reserves, and its standard deviation decreases proportionally.
This result was to be expected, as increasing interest rates raises the opportunity cost of
holding excess reserves and the model predicts that this would increase the likelihood that
the treasurer would stay late in the oﬃce. Similarly, decreasing all key ECB rates by 2%,
i.e. decreasing the opportunity cost of staying in the oﬃce, leads to an increase in excess
reserves. However, the eﬀect is much stronger than under the previous scenario: total
excess reserves increase to 237% of the baseline scenario. This stronger reaction of excess
reserves to a lowering of rates suggests a (plausible) convexity in the relationship between
rates and excess reserves. The standard deviation also increases signiﬁcantly and more than
proportionally, reaching 326% of the baseline standard deviation. Hence, excess reserves are
likely to become signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult to forecast when rates fall. Indeed, the ECB
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reserves and a worsening of the performance of its forecasting.
Although the model therefore generates the plausible result that the level of excess re-
serves is to some extent interest rate dependent, this should not lead to the conclusion that
excess reserves play an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
A central bank would simply consider the eﬀects of the interest rate level when making its
forecasts of the overall need for reserves to ensured balanced liquidity conditions.
Scenario iii and iv. When the corridor of standing facility rates is symmetrically tight-
ened to a width of only 100 basis points (from the actual 200 basis points), excess reserves
decline. This mainly reﬂects the increased level of the deposit facility. The opposite eﬀect
is obtained when the corridor is widened to a total of 400 basis points.
Scenario v. Under the ﬁfth scenario, the deposit facility is completely abolished, elimi-
nating any beneﬁt of staying in the oﬃce. As expected, excess reserves increase substantially
to 392% of the baseline scenario level. The standard deviation of excess reserves increases
to more than 900% of the baseline level.
Scenario vi and vii. Changing the penalty rate, however, does not have a signiﬁcant
impact, although it would have been plausible that it increases the incentive of treasurers
to stay in the oﬃce on the last business day of the maintenance period to ensure they have
complied with reserve requirements. Reducing the penalty rate by 2.5% so that it would
equal the marginal lending rate and there is eﬀectively no penalty, leads to the expected
eﬀect of an increase in excess reserves, although this eﬀect is rather small.
Scenarios viii and ix. Changes to banks’ reserves requirements, have a signiﬁcant impact.
Doubling reserve requirements (from EUR 130 billion to EUR 260 billion) leads to a fall in
excess reserves to 50% of their baseline level. Halving reserve requirements leads to a large
increase in excess reserves to 162% of the baseline scenario level. Standard deviations of
excess reserves change also along these lines.
Scenario x and xi. Changes in the volatility of payment shocks can be interpreted
as: a) changes in the eﬃciency of payment systems, b) changes in the volume of payment
activities, or c) changes in the smoothness of the functioning of money markets. Changes
in the volatility of payment shocks also produce the expected eﬀects. A doubling of the
volatility of payment shocks increases the level of excess reserves to 300% and the standard
deviation to even 774% of the baseline levels. A decrease of the variance of shocks has
opposite eﬀects. The cash change-over reserve maintenance period with its accumulated
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the scenarios above, mean for euro area money markets and the practice of day-to-day
implementation of monetary policy by the ECB? Increased volatility normally implies ceteris
paribus increased forecasting errors of excess reserves. The standard deviation of actual
accumulated excess reserves in the Eurosystem forecasts has been around EUR 2 billion in
the years 2001 and 2002. Since under some of the scenarios above, the standard deviation
of excess reserves almost quadrupled, one can well imagine that also forecast errors might
quadruple, leading to a standard deviation of forecast errors of around EUR 8 billion. This
would actually make forecast errors in excess reserves the largest source of errors in the
calibration of open market operations, i.e. before the other classical autonomous factors
such as banknotes and Government deposits. Some additional volatility of the overnight
interest rate would thus be experienced on the last days of the reserve maintenance period.
To the extent that the ECB disliked such additional volatility, it could make additional
eﬀorts to forecast excess reserves. However, one could argue that this volatility of money
market rates would remain limited to the shortest maturities and would not be transmitted
along the yield curve towards maturities judged relevant for the transmission of monetary
policy. In so far, the ECB may also simply accept such additional transitory volatility.
7 Conclusions
Although excess reserves should not play a particular role in monetary macroeconomics,
it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in day-to-day monetary policy
implementation because they constitute an only partially predictable reserve market factor,
similar to other so-called autonomous liquidity factors like for instance the deposits of the
Government with the central bank.
A simple transaction cost model of excess reserves presented was able to replicate very
well the excess reserves patterns observed, in particular the intra-reserve maintenance period
pattern. The model was mainly based on the (low) cost to treasurers of using the deposit
facility. This was exempliﬁed by the choice of either bearing a daily cost of staying in the
oﬃce until money markets close to ﬁne tune the end of day position, or leaving somewhat
earlier and letting end of day payment shocks impact on reserve holdings.
The simulation of the model revealed that, as expected, one should observe an increase
of excess reserves when the level of interest rates, and in particular the level of the deposit
facility rate, declines. However, the resulting negative correlation between interest rates and
excess reserves is not the basis for an excess reserves channel of monetary policy transmission
because the excess reserves in the model are nothing that a bank could use to expand its
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May 2004loans and hence to create additional money. Excess reserves are not a stable quantity at
the level of individual banks, but just a stochastic ex-post residual from payment shocks.
Therefore, it does not make any economic sense to expect individual banks to expand loans
if this residual increases on average.
In this context, we used our simple model to simulate the impact of various other changes
to exogenous variables on the level and volatility of excess reserves. The results suggest not
only that excess reserves may increase considerably under some changes of the framework
for monetary policy implementation, but also that their volatility and hence unpredictability
could. This could potentially cause an increase of the volatility of the overnight rate at the
very end of the reserve maintenance period.
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where φ(x) is the value of the cumulative normal distribution and φ(x)c =1− φ(x).
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May 2004Appendix B: Model with weekend days
The much more complicated formulation presented below results from the fact that a new
maintenance period may start over the weekend, and treasurers can only take actions from
Monday to Friday. Recourse to the marginal lending facility and deposit facility on a Friday
will be automatically extended to both Saturday and Sunday. This opens a variety of possible
responses depending on whether the end of the maintenance period falls on a certain day
of the week. The variables deﬁned will adopt now the double subscript t,z where z =
{Mon,Tue,...,Sun}, and as before t = {1,2,...,T}. We further deﬁne the set of all days
as Ω = {z : z ∈{ Mon,...,Sun};t = {1,...,T}}, and use ν to denote the level of reserve
requirements of next maintenance period.
mt,z =

         































˜ µt,z − rII
t,z
  
if (t,z) ∈ Ω2,3
mt−1,z−1 if (t,z) ∈ Ω5
dt,z =

     




















if (t,z) ∈ Ω2,3
dt−1,z−1 if (t,z) ∈ Ω5
where the sets Ωi for i = 0 to 6 are deﬁned as:
Ω1 = {z : z ∈{ Mon,...,Thu};t = T}
Ω2 = {z : z ∈ Fri;t = T}
Ω3 = {z : z ∈ Fri;t = T − 1}
Ω4 = {z : z ∈ Fri;t = T − 2}
Ω5 = {z : z ∈{ Sat,Sun}}
Ω0 = {Ω1 ∪ Ω2 ∪ ...∪ Ω5}
c
Ω6 = {z : z ∈ Fri}} ∩ Ω0
where c denotes the complement set, and where we have adopted the notation Ωi,j =





3i f z ∈ Ω4,6
2i f z ∈ Ω3
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May 2004Note that Ω0,Ω1,...,Ω5 are disjoint sets such that Ω = Ω0∪Ω1∪...∪Ω5,a n dΩ6 is simply
a subset of Ω0.
Finally, µt,z is deﬁned as that µ which maximizes the cash ﬂow function Mt,z, subject to
0 ≤ µ ≤ rII
t,z and x = id




























{µ − Ψ(Tν+( j − λz)µ)}i
r
t,z
˜ µt,z is deﬁned as that µ which solves (9) subject to µ ≥ rII
t,z and x = im
t,z. The corresponding
maximum values resulting from these two constrained optimization problems will be denoted
by M∗
t,z and ˜ M∗
t,z respectively. The expression above follows from the fact that funds placed
in the deposit facility will be remunerated at the deposit facility rate id, but funds held
as normal reserves with the central bank will only be remunerated at the rate ir as long
as not exceeding the amount of required reserves. The diﬀerent components of equation
(9) are explained as follows: the ﬁrst summand gives the cash ﬂow resulting from placing
money in the deposit facility (use of the marginal facility for ˜ µt,z); Fb
t,z gives the cash ﬂow
resulting from placing money in the account with the central bank in those days before the
end of the current maintenance period, i.e. the remuneration for those holdings that do not
exceed the reserve requirements. Fa
t,z represents that same cash ﬂow after the end of the
maintenance period. Finally, the last summand gives the costs of unfulﬁlling the reserve
requirements. Note that the ECB rates will not change over the weekend and this is why
their corresponding subindexes remain t,z in the formula.
Note that for the above formulas to hold we will adopt the convention of deﬁning rI
t,z =
rIII
t−1,z−1 − mt−1,z−1 + dt−1,z−1 if z ∈ Ω5, as the central bank is closed over the weekend. It is
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fεtdε. The additional integral ﬁve is related to the diﬃculties
associated with the end of the maintenance period ending over the weekend. Reserve hold-
ings that can be remunerated over the next maintenance period are dealt with in the ﬁfth
integral. The solutions of the ﬁrst four integrals under normality assumptions is similar to




























































Z − z +1
29
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 361
May 2004Table 1: Distribution of reserve requirements in the euro area.a
Reserve Requirements (q) in EUR mill. Number of banks
0 551
0 <q≤ 10 2076
10 <q≤ 100 738
100 <q≤ 500 114
500 <q≤ 1000 26
1000 <q 17
aThe ﬁgures displayed are extracted from a sample of 3522 banks which
accounted for 84% of total reserve requirements.
Table 2: Estimated parameters.a
parameter value
α1 19 × 10−6
α2 0.17
δ 2 × 10−7
p 0.38
β1 55 × 10−6
β2 0.33
aRecall that variance of the shocks, σ2 = α1 +α2q, δ is the ‘cost of staying’;
p is the probability that the shock is zero; β1, β2 are parameters associated with
precautionary holdings, i.e. g = β1 + β2q. α1, β1 and δ are in billions euro.
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X1 X2 Total ML DF
scenario mean st dev mean st dev mean st dev mean st dev mean st dev
euro area data 3.268 0.356 14.029 1.328 17.297 1.518 0.263 0.176 0.231 0.113
benchmark 3.261 0.011 12.706 0.268 15.966 0.268 0.997 0.010 0.212 0.010
Values
∆a l lr a t e sb y2 % 3.261 0.012 10.851 0.264 14.113 0.265 1.001 0.010 0.745 0.018
∇ all rates by 2% 3.260 0.074 14.472 1.006 17.732 1.000 1.002 0.011 0.182 0.255
∇ band by 0.5% 3.261 0.009 12.095 0.217 15.356 0.218 1.001 0.009 0.736 0.013
∆ band by 1% 3.261 0.010 13.367 0.232 16.628 0.233 1.001 0.010 0.198 0.008
abolish id 3.262 0.011 21.613 1.001 24.875 1.000 1.001 0.009 0.000 0.000
∇ of ip by 2.5% 3.259 0.010 12.716 0.214 15.976 0.214 0.992 0.008 0.733 0.014
∆o fip by 5% 3.260 0.012 12.614 0.218 15.874 0.221 1.006 0.010 0.207 0.010
∆o fq by 100% 1.630 0.005 10.719 0.210 12.349 0.211 1.013 0.010 0.219 0.009
∇ of q by 50% 6.521 0.023 14.413 0.268 20.935 0.271 0.983 0.010 0.197 0.009
∆ σ by 100% 3.261 0.010 40.762 0.555 44.023 0.557 0.393 0.004 0.169 0.005
∇ σ 50% 3.262 0.011 3.365 0.079 6.627 0.081 2.554 0.025 0.313 0.020
% of benchmark
∆a l lr a t e sb y2 % 100 107 85 99 88 99 100 99 351 187
∇ all rates by 2% 100 677 114 375 111 373 100 110 86 2625
∇ band by 0.5% 100 84 95 81 96 82 100 88 347 137
∆ band by 1% 100 92 105 86 104 87 100 100 93 80
abolish id 100 101 170 373 156 373 100 88 00
∇ of ip by 2.5% 100 95 100 80 100 80 99 72 345 145
∆o fip by 5% 100 110 99 81 99 82 100 95 98 102
∆o fq by 100% 50 50 84 78 77 79 101 92 103 94
∇ of q by 50% 200 206 113 100 131 101 98 97 93 95
∆ σ by 100% 100 90 321 207 276 208 39 37 80 50
∇ σ50% 100 97 26 30 42 30 255 235 147 203
aFigures refer to observations on the last day of the maintenance period. Sample period is 2001-5 to 2003-2. X1
denotes excess reserves generated by banks that are not obliged to fulﬁll minimum reserve requirements; X2 excess
reserves generated by banks obliged to fulﬁll reserve requirements. ML denotes average use of marginal lending
facility, and DF average use of deposit facility.
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